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REMODELING FEDERAL MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: A POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT
TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Nancy Kubasek∗ & Tiffany Durham∗∗
During the debates about healthcare reform, the Congressional
Budget Office found that federal medical liability reform could
drastically reduce federal budget deficits, yet political and legal
scholars could not reach agreement about the best way for the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) to provide such reform.
Instead, provisions were made to fund state level demonstration
projects. The law that is considered one of the most successful models
to date of conventional tort reform is the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act of California. This Article exams that legislation and
discusses how we might use what can be learned from that legislation
to improve the PPACA.
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I. FEDERAL TORT REFORM UNDER THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
During the many years that medical liability laws have provided
redress for victims of malpractice, there has been ever-present
controversy about the most effective way to handle these malpractice
cases in court.1 Much of this controversy is fueled by the fact that
medical liability laws are managed at the state level. With various
states creating laws differently, there is currently a messy patchwork
of tort law addressing malpractice.2 As will be explained throughout
this Article, this patchwork of legislation has resulted in increased
malpractice insurance premiums, an increased practice of defensive
medicine,3 and increased health care costs in the United States.4
In reaction to the legal and financial problems resulting from our
current system of tort laws, tort reform via the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)5 was suggested as part of the
solution.6 During the 2009 debates about healthcare reform, the
1. See Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medical
Malpractice “Crisis”, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 489 (2012) (describing the opposing
perspectives of conservatives versus liberals on medical malpractice and effective tort
reform). For a history of past suggestions for tort reform by legal scholars and policy
makers, see generally Chapter II of TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005).
2. Williams, supra note 1, at 492 (“[T]he federal government could pass national
medical malpractice reform . . . to replace the states’ patchwork of varied and disparate
medical malpractice statutes and rules.”).
3. Id. at 486–87 (“Estimates of how much, dollar-wise, defensive medicine costs the
healthcare system are quite disparate, with the American Medical Association quoting
figures as high as $126 billion annually . . . .”).
4. Id. at 482–83 (highlighting Republicans’ association of increased health care costs
with frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits). However, Williams later explains that:
In general, most patients harmed by medical negligence do not file medical
malpractice claims. Various studies have examined the problem, reaching
consistent conclusions. In a California study, 1% of patients were injured by
medical negligence, but statewide only 10% of injured patients sued. A Harvard
Medical Practice Study found that, in fifty-one New York hospitals, 1% of
patients were injured by negligent treatment yet the number of negligent injuries
was 6.7 times greater than the number of malpractice claims filed statewide . . . .
Based on the volume of studies regarding medical malpractice claim filings, it
would appear that any suggestion that the current medical malpractice system is
overrun with frivolous litigation is patently false.
Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
6. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, The Health Care Reform Act
of 2010 and Medical Malpractice Liability: Worlds in Collision or Ships Passing in the
Night?, 64 SMU L. REV. 735, 737 (2011) (“In the log-rolling that led up to the passage of
the PPACA, there was some speculation that this partisan split might be bridged. For
example, when President Barack Obama gave an invited presentation to the members of the
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Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that federal medical
liability reform would drastically reduce federal budget deficits by
$54 billion over the course of ten years.7 Political and legal scholars
disagreed about the best way for the PPACA to provide adequate tort
reform; many pushed for federalization of medical malpractice laws.8
Some focused specifically on mandating caps on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice cases, while others suggested
“conditioning states’ receipt of federal health funds . . . on their
willingness to adopt changes to their tort systems.”9
In the end, the PPACA did not federalize medical malpractice
laws, nor did it include any proposals for tort reform.10 Instead, the
PPACA included a provision to allocate funds for “state-level
demonstration projects” that would allow for states to study the
problem of medical malpractice within their borders and to test
“malpractice reform alternatives.”11 Such alternatives could include
offer and disclosure programs and health courts, among others.12
With the passing of the PPACA, and its being upheld as
constitutional, many states have planned and implemented these

American Medical Association, some construed his remarks as indicating a willingness to
address medical malpractice reform in the PPACA.”).
7. See Leonard J. Nelson III et al., Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21
HEALTH MATRIX 443, 445 (2011).
8. Williams, supra note 1, at 491.
9. Id. at 492 (quotation marks omitted) (explaining the suggestions made by medical
malpractice scholars and professors, Michelle M. Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, during the
2009 debate regarding national healthcare reform).
10. Id. at 489 (“Although some commentators predicted medical liability reform would
be included in the PPACA, the final bill paid lip service to the issue . . . by not incorporating
any proposed tort reforms but instead merely allocating funds to study the problem on a
state level.”); see also Nelson, supra note 7, at 444 (“There was a chance that alternative
medical liability reforms . . . would be bundled with the health care reform as part of a
bipartisan compromise, but it was not included in the final legislation.”) (footnote omitted).
11. Nelson, supra note 7, at 444; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 498. Williams
explains that “Alternative Legal Systems” generally consist of four categories:
The first is alternative dispute resolution, consisting of the creation of
health/medical courts, the use of private contracts to control any disputes, early
offer programs to encourage prompt settlement prior to the filing of a claim, and
compensating claims through a fault-based administrative system. The second
category is alternatives to the negligence standard, which include compensating
claims through a no-fault administrative system and implementation of predesignated compensable events. The third category is relocation of legal
responsibility . . . while the fourth category frequently discussed is the creation of
enterprise insurance.
Williams, supra note 1, at 498.
12. Nelson, supra note 7, at 444.

2015]

FEDERAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

1147

suggested demonstration projects.13 However, as was made clear
during the ongoing healthcare reform debates, “malpractice reform
alternatives” are not the only route for addressing the problems
surrounding cases of medical malpractice. Instead, many states have
focused on what has been considered “conventional tort reform” at
the state-level.14 Conventional tort reform may include limitation on
access to courts, modification of liability rules, or focusing on caps
on certain damages.15 What has been considered one of the most
successful models to date of conventional tort reform, specifically, of
capping damages, is the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA) of California.16 Since its enactment in 1975, MICRA has
been dubbed the “gold standard” of malpractice reform.17
II. HISTORY OF MICRA
Prior to California’s MICRA in 1975, the state was experiencing
a significant healthcare crisis. Medical liability costs were getting out
of control and were forcing community clinics, health centers,
physicians, and other health care providers out of practice.18 The
crisis resulted from juries who were awarding excessive financial
compensation, which caused the medical premiums to rise steeply by
more than 300 percent.19 Physicians were faced with five or more
13. See Master, Demonstration, Evaluation and Research Studies for ORDI System of
Record 09-70-0591, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov
/medicare/demonstration-projects/demoprojectsevalrpts/downloads/mastersorlist.pdf (last
visited Nov. 12, 2014) (providing a list of current ongoing demonstration projects).
14. Williams, supra note 1, at 492–93. Williams explains that “Conventional Tort
Reform” generally consists of three categories:
The first is limitation on access to courts, which includes shortening statutes of
limitations, enacting statutes of repose, and establishing screening panels. The
second category is modification of liability rules, which includes eliminating joint
and several liability rules, imposing higher standards for proving breaches of
informed consent, and eliminating res ipsa loquitur. The third category is damages
reform, consisting of caps on economic, punitive and/or non-economic damages,
limiting attorney’s fees, mandating collateral source offsets, and requiring
periodic payments instead of allowing lump sum payouts.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Nelson, supra note 7, at 456.
17. Id.
18. History of MICRA, CALIFORNIANS ALLIED FOR PATIENT PROT., http://micra.org
/micra/history-of-micra.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) [hereinafter CAPP History].
19. California’s Medical Malpractice Insurance History, ARTHUR J. GALLAGER & CO.,
http://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/state-resources/California-Medical-Malpractice
-Insurance/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter GALLAGER].
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choices, and none of the options were beneficial to them or society.
Their options were to raise medical costs, make medical care
unaffordable for numerous patients, discontinue their professional
liability insurance coverage, leave the state, or stop practicing
medicine altogether.20 Many physicians were trying to confront this
steep rise in malpractice premiums, specifically those physicians in
rural areas or in high-risk specialties who were being coerced to end
their practice due to not being qualified for or not being able to
afford medical liability insurance.21
Due to the closing of medical practices, payments for inflated
premiums were subsequently falling to consumers in the manner of
increase healthcare costs, thus causing patients to suffer. With the
increase in healthcare costs, patients were being denied care because
they could not afford it. At the request of Governor Jerry Brown, the
California State Legislature called a session to resolve this healthcare
crisis.22 In that session, MICRA was passed with bipartisan
support.23
The MICRA law is comprised of seven separate statutes, which
are all aimed to work together cohesively with the collective
objective of maintaining malpractice premiums at an equitable level,
while justly rewarding patients who have been injured from medical
malpractice. The central provisions of MICRA are: (1) a cap of
$250,000 on non-economic damages24 of recovery against
physicians; (2) limited allowance of attorney fees, so that more of the
monetary awards are received by the plaintiff; (3) unlimited
compensation for economic25 and punitive26 damages; (4) mandating
20. MICRA: A Brief History, CAL. MED. ASS’N, https://www.cmanet.org/issues-and
-advocacy/cmas-top-issues/micra/micra-a-brief-history/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014)
[hereinafter CMA History].
21. CAPP History, supra note 18.
22. Kenneth R. Zuetel, Jr., The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975: Then
and Now, 5 INT’L J. COSMETIC SURGERY & AESTHETIC DERMATOLOGY 201, 201 (2003).
23. Nelson, supra note 7, at 457.
24. CMA History, supra note 20. Under MICRA, there is a cap on the award for
non-economic damages of $250,000. Compensation for non-economic damages is
subjective and arduous to prove and assess. Non-economic damages include: pain, suffering,
emotional distress, inconvenience, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium,
and harm to satisfaction of life.
25. Id. Under MICRA, there is no cap for economic damages on the amount the injured
patient can receive as compensation. Economic damages are objective, can be measured,
and can be validated. Economic damages include compensation for past and future medical
expenses, harm of lost earnings past and future, loss of property, costs of repair or
replacement, and the harm of employment or business prospects.
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an advance notice of a claim and a statute of limitations on claims;
(5) use of binding arbitration; (6) the admittance of evidence of
collateral source payments to be deliberated; and (7) the allowance of
periodic payments of monetary awards.27 Through the California
State Legislature’s enactment of MICRA, the legislature expected to
resolve the healthcare crisis in California, so that medical care could
become more affordable for both patient and physician. In the end,
this statute led to a decrease in malpractice insurance rates and more
affordable care for the state of California.28 Since the establishment
of MICRA, the state of California has “become one of the most
stable medical malpractice markets in the country.”29
III. MICRA PROVISIONS
A. Cap on Non-Economic Damages
MICRA, found in California Civil Code section 3333.2,30 places
a limit on the amount that a plaintiff can recover for non-economic
losses at trial due to medical negligence at $250,000. Since 1975, the
cap has remained fixed at $250,000, and the award cap affects nearly
every claim against licensed health care providers for negligent acts
or lack of providing adequate services, including claims against
doctors, nurses, hospitals, psychotherapists, chiropractors,
emergency medical technicians, blood banks, sperm banks, dentists,

26. Id. Under MICRA, there is no cap for punitive damages on the amount that may be
rendered in medical liability cases. Punitive damages may be rendered to reprimand the
defendant and to prevent future medical errors.
27. CAPP History, supra note 18.
28. William G. Hamm et al., MICRA and Access to Health Care, CALIFORNIANS ALLIED
FOR PATIENT PROT., http://www.micra.org/studies-research/FINAL2014MICRAReport01.21
.14.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“California was the first state to reform its medical
liability tort system, and many other states have followed its lead . . . in response to a
medical liability crisis similar to the one California experienced in the mid-1970s, Texas in
2003 enacted medical liability reforms that included caps on non-economic damages.”).
29. GALLAGER, supra note 19.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2014). The California Civil Code states:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional
negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
Id.
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and other licensed health care professionals in a disagreement.31
Regardless of the significance of the injuries claimed by the plaintiff,
the cap on non-economic damages is applied to all cases, including
cases unfortunately ensuing from the death of a patient. The award
for non-economic damages is reduced after the jury has rendered its
decision to abide by the MICRA limitations on awards for
non-economic losses: “The jurors can award whatever amount they
believe is appropriate for non-economic losses, but upon a
post-verdict motion by the defendant, the judge will reduce the
award to comply with MICRA’s limits before entering the final
judgment in the case.”32
B. Limitations on Plaintiff Attorney Fees
The Business and Professions Code section 614633 regulates the
sum of attorney’s fees that can be given to the plaintiff’s attorneys in
medical malpractice trials. Previously, plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees
resulted in medical malpractice plaintiff’s receiving less of the
awarded amount than plaintiffs in other types of cases.34 MICRA has
established a fee plan that results in a balanced reduction in fees as
the award of the resolution sum increases. For the first $50,000
recovered, the plaintiff’s attorney will receive 40 percent of the
31. NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE TRIALS, RAND CORP. 8 (2004), available at http://www.rand.org/content
/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG234.pdf.
32. Id.
33. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2014). The Code provides:
(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for representing
any person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury or damage
against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional
negligence in excess of the following limits:
(1) 40 percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) 33 and 1/3 percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(3) 25 percent of the next five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) recovered.
(4) 15 percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds six hundred thousand
dollars ($600,000).
(b) If periodic payments are awarded to the plaintiff pursuant to Section 667.7 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the court shall place a total value on these payments
based upon the projected life expectancy of the plaintiff and include this amount
in computing the total award from which attorney’s fees are calculated under this
section. 25 percent of the next five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000)
recovered.
Id.
34. Zuetel, supra note 22, at 202 (“Most standard attorney contingency fee contracts
allow for recovery of fees representing 33⅓% of the settlement or 40% of the recovery.”).
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award.35 However, for the next $50,000 the attorney will receive 33⅓
percent of the damages.36 For the next $500,000, attorney fees will
be recoverable up to 25 percent. And for amounts over $600,000,
attorney fees will be recoverable in an amount of 15 percent.37 Due
to section 6146, less money is going into the hands of the plaintiff’s
lawyers and more is being received by the injured plaintiffs.
C. Evidence of Collateral Sources
California Civil Code section 3333.138 permits a healthcare
defendant to enter into evidence various possible sources of
payments that can assist in compensating the plaintiff for the
economic damages that were created by the malpractice of the
physician, and thus decrease the outcome or settlement award of the
case.39 The objective of this section of the Code is to remove the
so-called “double recovery” acquired by plaintiffs who have had
their medical fees paid by their own health insurances, and yet
acquire damages for such expenses from the defendant.40 Therefore,
the jury is provided the opportunity to “set plaintiff’s damages at a
lower level because of its awareness of plaintiff’s ‘net’ collateral
source benefits.”41 Another objective is to protect the plaintiff from
the “double reduction” that would take place if the jury decreased the
35.
36.
37.
38.

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a)(1) (West 2003).
Id. § 6146(a)(2).
Id. §§ 6146(a)(3)–(4).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 2014). The Code provides:
(a) In the event the defendant so elects, in an action for personal injury against a
health care provider based upon professional negligence, he may introduce
evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the
personal injury pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, [FN1] any state
or federal income disability or worker's compensation act, any health sickness or
income-disability insurance, accident insurance that provides health benefits or
income-disability coverage, and any contract or agreement of any group,
organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the cost
of medical, hospital, dental, or other health care services. Where the defendant
elects to introduce such evidence, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of any
amount which the plaintiff has paid or contributed to secure his right to any
insurance benefits concerning which the defendant has introduced evidence.
(b) No source of collateral benefits introduced pursuant to subdivision (a) shall
recover any amount against the plaintiff nor shall it be subrogated to the rights of
the plaintiff against a defendant.

Id.
39. Zuetel, supra note 22, at 203 (“Normally, such payments, called ‘collateral
sources,’ are not admissible into evidence at trial.”).
40. See Barme v. Wood, 689 P.2d 446, 449 (Cal. 1984).
41. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 38 Cal.3d 137, 164–65 (1985).

1152

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1143

award due to collateral source benefits.42 However, the collateral
source could gain compensation of those benefits from the plaintiff’s
tort recovery.43 Also, this section of the Code exists to ensure that
any reduction in malpractice awards that could result from the jury’s
consideration of the plaintiff’s collateral source benefits will inure to
the defendant’s benefit, instead of benefitting the collateral source.44
D. Periodic Payments
California Code of Civil Procedure section 667.745 requires that
if the defendant healthcare provider makes an appropriate request of
42. MICRA Manual: 2012 Edition, HORVITZ & LEVY, LLP 2 (2012), available at
http://horvitzlevy.com/images/ps_attachment/attachment740.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2–3.
45. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 2009). The Code provides:
(a) In any action for injury or damages against a provider of health care services, a
superior court shall, at the request of either party, enter a judgment ordering that
money damages or its equivalent for future damages of the judgment creditor be
paid in whole or in part by periodic payments rather than by a lump-sum payment
if the award equals or exceeds fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in future damages.
In entering a judgment ordering the payment of future damages by periodic
payments, the court shall make a specific finding as to the dollar amount of
periodic payments which will compensate the judgment creditor for such future
damages. As a condition to authorizing periodic payments of future damages, the
court shall require the judgment debtor who is not adequately insured to post
security adequate to assure full payment of such damages awarded by the
judgment. Upon termination of periodic payments of future damages, the court
shall order the return of this security, or so much as remains, to the judgment
debtor.
(b) (1) The judgment ordering the payment of future damages by periodic
payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar
amount of the payments, the interval between payments, and the number of
payments or the period of time over which payments shall be made. Such
payments shall only be subject to modification in the event of the death of the
judgment creditor. (2) In the event that the court finds that the judgment debtor
has exhibited a continuing pattern of failing to make the payments, as specified in
paragraph (1), the court shall find the judgment debtor in contempt of court and, in
addition to the required periodic payments, shall order the judgment debtor to pay
the judgment creditor all damages caused by the failure to make such periodic
payments, including court costs and attorney’s fees.
(c) However, money damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be
reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment creditor,
but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment creditor owed a duty of
support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his death. In such cases the
court which rendered the original judgment, may, upon petition of any party in
interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future damages
in accordance with this subdivision.
(d) Following the occurrence or expiration of all obligations specified in the
periodic payment judgment, any obligation of the judgment debtor to make further
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the court that has rendered a decision against him or her in future
damages of $50,000 or more, compensation in the case may be paid
by periodic payments as opposed to one lump sum. Section 667.7
requires that after the jury or arbitrator makes a binding decision
distinguishing the total amount of the future damages owed by the
defendant, the defendant then moves the court or arbitrator for a
request permitting periodic payments. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant present propositions of annuities or additional payment
plans to the court for deliberation.46 Being contingent on such
variables as the life-expectancy rate of the plaintiff, the assessment
of the annuity provider, and the current rates, a substantial quantity
of money can be protected by the insurer who proceeds meticulously
in planning the annuity package.47 Then, the court establishes the
dollar amount of the periodic payments that will sufficiently
compensate the plaintiff for his or her injuries.48 Subsequently, the
judgment is fulfilled upon the final payment, or as contrarily ordered
by the court.49 However, as an option, the defendant may choose to
pay the total sum of the future payments, decreased to its present
rate, thus satisfying the judgment upon that payment.50
E. Arbitration
California Code of Civil Procedure section 129551 permits
healthcare providers in potential medical malpractice actions to

payments shall cease and any security given, pursuant to subdivision (a) shall
revert to the judgment debtor.
Id.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Zuetel, supra note 22, at 203.
Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 2007). The Code provides:
(a) Any contract for medical services which contains a provision for arbitration of
any dispute as to professional negligence of a health care provider shall have such
provision as the first article of the contract and shall be expressed in the following
language: “It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to
whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or
unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be
determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by
a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial
review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it,
are giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court
of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of arbitration.”
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require binding arbitration of medical malpractice actions in advance
of a possible lawsuit. The binding arbitration is allowed if the
agreement follows the specified language that is defined in
subdivisions (a) and (b) and is signed by the patient.52 Upon signing
the agreement, the patient is bound by the arbitration clause, and his
or her heirs, spouse, and children have to abide by arbitration in any
cases against the healthcare provider for medical malpractice.53
According to subdivision (e), the patient’s endeavors to evade
arbitration on the basis that it is unfair or biased are automatically
dismissed as long as the statutory language is appropriately applied.54
F. Intent to Sue
California Code of Civil Procedure section 36455 requires an
individual to give a healthcare provider a minimum of a ninety-day
(b) Immediately before the signature line provided for the individual contracting
for the medical services must appear the following in at least 10-point bold red
type:
“NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO
HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL
ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR
COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.”
(c) Once signed, such a contract governs all subsequent open-book account
transactions for medical services for which the contract was signed until or unless
rescinded by written notice within 30 days of signature. Written notice of such
rescission may be given by a guardian or conservator of the patient if the patient is
incapacitated or a minor.
(d) Where the contract is one for medical services to a minor, it shall not be
subject to disaffirmance if signed by the minor's parent or legal guardian.
(e) Such a contract is not a contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor otherwise
improper, where it complies with subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of this section.
(f) Subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) shall not apply to any health care service plan
contract offered by an organization registered pursuant to Article 2.5
(commencing with Section 12530) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government
Code, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.2 (commencing with Section 1340) of
Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code, which contains an arbitration agreement
if the plan complies with paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1363 of the
Health and Safety Code, or otherwise has a procedure for notifying prospective
subscribers of the fact that the plan has an arbitration provision, and the plan
contracts conform to subdivision (h) of Section 1373 of the Health and Safety
Code.
Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Zuetel, supra note 22, at 204.
Id.
Id.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364 (West 2006). The Code provides, in part:
(a) No action based upon the health care provider’s professional negligence may
be commenced unless the defendant has been given at least 90 days’ prior notice
of the intention to commence the action.
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notice of an intent to sue prior to filing a lawsuit for professional
negligence.56 No specific form of notice is demanded, but it must
inform the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of
loss sustained, including the specific nature of the injury suffered.57
G. Statute of Limitations
California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.558 allows for
medical malpractice cases to have their own specific time limitations.
Under MICRA, a case must be brought to commencement within
three years after the date of the injury or one year after the plaintiff
discovers, or through the use of rational attentiveness should have
discovered the injury, whichever circumstance happens first. This
time period could be extended, however, if the plaintiff can prove
fraud, intentional concealment, or the presence of a foreign body
with no therapeutic purpose in the person of the injured party.
(b) No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the
legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity
the nature of the injuries suffered.
(c) The notice may be served in the manner prescribed in Chapter 5 (commencing
with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2.
(d) If the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended 90
days from the service of the notice.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable with respect to any
defendant whose name is unknown to the plaintiff at the time of filing the
complaint and who is identified therein by a fictitious name, as provided in
Section 474.
Id.
56. Id. § 364(a) (West 2006).
57. Id. § 364(b).
58. Id. § 340.5. The Code provides:

In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such
person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action
shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,
whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal
action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following: (1) upon proof of
fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which
has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured
person. Actions by a minor shall be commenced within three years from the date
of the alleged wrongful act except that actions by a minor under the full age of six
years shall be commenced within three years or prior to his eighth birthday
whichever provides a longer period. Such time limitation shall be tolled for
minors for any period during which parent or guardian and defendant’s insurer or
health care provider have committed fraud or collusion in the failure to bring an
action on behalf of the injured minor for professional negligence.
Id.
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IV. THE EFFECTS AND BENEFITS OF MICRA
Since 1975, MICRA has been advertised by many as successful
in protecting access to healthcare services, and fighting against rising
healthcare costs.59 The MICRA has been supported by a large and
diverse association of patient advocates and healthcare providers
across California.60
A. Stabilizing Premiums and Healthcare Costs
Before the enactment of MICRA, medical liability costs were
out of control and were forcing health centers, physicians,
community clinics, and other healthcare providers out of practice.61
Since its passing, MICRA has been successful in stabilizing liability
costs. According to the California Medical Association, research in
2011 shows how MICRA has regulated medical premiums. Below,
Figure 1 demonstrates the specific premium costs for physicians
based upon various counties in the United States, which are then
compared to Monterey County Medical Society. Based on this chart
from 2011, MICRA had saved physicians in Monterey County,
California an average of $67,861:

59. Nelson, supra note 7, at 467–68 (“The AMA touts the relative stability of the
California insurance market since the enactment of MICRA in 1975 as proof of the efficacy
of caps.”); see Michael S. Hull et al., House Bill 4 and Proposition 12: An Analysis with
Legislative History, 36 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005) (“Patients in California have access
to health care because insurance premiums are more affordable and stable. Injured parties
have access to the courts and receive fair compensation for quantifiable damages,
settlements are expedited, gross abuses of excessive contingency fees have been eliminated,
and competition among insurance carriers thrives.”); see Reasons to Support MICRA, CAL.
MED. ASS’N, http://www.cmanet.org/issues-and-advocacy/cmas-top-issues/micra/reasons
-to-support-micra/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014) (“While eliminating or increasing the
Medical Injury Compensation and Reform Act (MICRA) cap on non-economic damages
will impact physician medical liability rates, it will also lead to higher costs and reduced
access for patients.”).
60. For an explanation of the American Medical Association’s support of MICRA, see
Nelson, supra note 7, at 462.
61. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), SAN DIEGO CNTY. MED. SOC’Y
22 (2013), http://www.sdcms.org/Portals/18/Assets/pdf/MICRA.pdf [hereinafter SAN DIEGO
CNTY. MED. SOC’Y].
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Figure 1. 2011 Monterey County Medical Society MICRA
Premium Savings Chart62

62. California Medical Association, 2011 MICRA Savings Charts, CMA (May 9, 2011),
http://www.cmanet.org/resource-library/detail?item=2011-micra-savings-charts.
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As displayed in this chart, the MICRA has been successful in
regulating liability costs and healthcare costs. But the Act is
especially important for protecting specialty and high-risk services,
such as: women’s healthcare, community clinics, health centers, and
rural physicians can at minimum manage to afford skyrocketing
costs. This is because “states without medical liability reform suffer
from shortages of providers leading to the closing of hospitals,
clinics, and trauma centers, and leaving patients with no doctors in
their immediate vicinity.”63 Supporting this notion, the American
Medical Association (AMA) conducted a study that revealed when
premiums rise, 45 percent of hospitals lose physicians and
experience emergency room cutbacks.64
The $250,000 cap on non-economic damages required by
MICRA makes healthcare more affordable by reducing the doctors’
and hospitals’ cost of covering themselves against medical liability,
thus reducing the incentive for physicians to practice defensive
medicine.65 Defensive medicine can be defined as physicians
requiring costly and medically unwarranted tests and procedures that
decrease their liability to lawsuits, but have no medical benefit
toward improving the patient’s health and well-being.66 By
decreasing the costs of medical liability insurance and reducing the
incentive to practice defensive medicine, a cap causes healthcare to
become more affordable and increases access to physicians and
hospitals for the public when they need care.67
According to California’s former nonpartisan legislative analyst,
if the state were to increase the cap from $250,000 to $500,000 that
would raise healthcare costs in California by a minimum of $9.5
billion annually.68 This would translate to an estimate of $1,000
63. Id.
64. MICRA: CALIFORNIA’S LANDMARK HEALTHCARE LIABILITY LAW—A NATIONAL

MODEL FOR ASSURING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HEALTHCARE, CAL. ALLIED FOR PATIENT
PROT. 4 (2005), available at http://www.sdcms.org/Portals/18/Assets/pdf/micra_handbook
.pdf.
65. For a discussion on the practice of defensive medicine and its effects on health care
costs, see Williams, supra note 1, at 486–87 (“Estimates of how much, dollar-wise,
defensive medicine costs the healthcare system are quite disparate, with the American
Medical Association quoting figures as high as $126 billion annually but a team of Harvard
researchers concluding that hospitals expend $38.8 billion each year on defensive medicine
costs and individual physicians $6.8 billion.”).
66. Hamm, supra note 28, Executive Summary.
67. Id.
68. SAN DIEGO CNTY. MED. SOC’Y, supra note 61, at 22.
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annually for a family of four. Thus any legislation endeavoring to
thwart MICRA’s purpose and protections will result in an increase in
healthcare costs, no improvement in quality, and a decrease in access
to healthcare services.69
B. Patient Safety Record
In addition, MICRA protects California’s strong patient safety
record. According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, between 2003 and 2009, the state had significantly fewer
adverse patient safety incidents per 100,000 people than the average
of all other states.70
“[P]olicy options that promote better patient safety may offer a
new avenue for reducing malpractice pressure on physicians, at the
same time that they improve clinical outcomes.”71 Greenberg,
Haviland, Ashwood, and Main conducted research to investigate
California’s patient safety and medical liability data from 2001 to
2005 with the goal of investigating California’s patient safety and
medical liability data.72 The study implied that California
county-level safety performance, as revealed by variations in annual
counts of patient safety indicators, is notably correlated with shifts in
the amount of malpractice claims ensuing in the same counties in the
same year. The counties that achieved improvement in the regularity
of patient safety indicators during the year generally corresponded to
an improvement in the amount of malpractice claims.73 The authors
of the study state:
It suggests that safety interventions that improve patient
outcomes have the potential to reduce malpractice claiming,
and in turn, malpractice pressure on providers. It also
suggests that the traditional legal doctrine of malpractice,
which focuses on deterring negligence and related injuries,
is at best incomplete in addressing the underlying problem
of patient safety in U.S. health care facilities.74
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Michael D. Greenberg et al., Is Better Patient Safety Associated with Less

Malpractice Activity?, RAND CORP. 1, 2 (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR824.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 15.
74. Greenberg, supra note 71.
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C. Patient Advocates and Healthcare Providers
Across California, a large and diverse association of patient
advocates and healthcare providers supports MICRA. Support for
MICRA is comprised of more than 700 groups such as: healthcare
providers, local governments, public safety and labor groups,
community clinics, community health centers, organizations
committed to disease prevention, hospitals, medical and dental
societies, medical groups, healthcare-provider-owned professional
liability carriers, among others. In the latest poll, it was found that,
overall, voters supported MICRA by more than a 2-1 margin, with
56 percent of voters in support and 25 percent against.75
V. ATTEMPT TO ALTER MICRA: PROPOSITION 46
Despite the assumed benefits of MICRA, it remains
controversial among many. According to Bob Pack, the main author
of the Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act, or Proposition 46,
MICRA has never been adjusted for inflation in thirty-eight years,
which he and his supporters believe to be a problem.76 Proposition
46, which was rejected by California voters during voting in
November 2014,77 proposed adjusting the $250,000 cap to account
for thirty-eight years of inflation. Pack claimed that, by raising the
cap, “the ballot measure would also help reduce medical errors by
requiring mandatory random drug and alcohol testing for physicians,
as a high-risk profession as airline pilots or other jobs where
intoxication-induced mistakes can cause deaths.”78 He also argued
that updating the MICRA cap would not increase healthcare costs
and that there would be no other discernable effect.79 He pointed out
that medical malpractice payments have decreased by 29 percent
over the past decade, as opposed to national healthcare spending
which increased by almost 60 percent.80 Pack believes that these
75. SAN DIEGO CNTY. MED. SOC’Y, supra note 52, at 25.
76. See Bob Pack, Want to Reduce Healthcare Costs? Start by Reducing Medical

Errors, BUDGET WATCHDOGS (2013), http://www.budgetwatchdogs.org/increase-the-micra
-cap/.
77. See Tracy Seipel & Jessica Calefati, California Voters Reject Propositions 45, 46,
48 Pass 47, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:11 PM), http://www.mercurynews
.com/breaking-news/ci_26866635/propositions-45-and-46-losing-early-returns.
78. Pack, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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“divergent trajectories lay waste in claims that litigation is
responsible for rising healthcare costs.”81 He concluded that the
outdated MICRA law is a “one-size-fits-all solution” that doesn’t
function within the intricacy of medical malpractice; and many
times, victims cannot find an attorney willing to take their case due
to the limitations placed on attorney fees.82
However, according to Hamm, Frech III, and Wazzan,
California consultants and professors of economics, the increase in
the rate in the average payment to medical liability claimants has
surpassed the rate of inflation.83 While the cap has limited
non-economic damages awards and deterred the filing of weak and
non-meritorious claims, it has not prohibited the average payment of
awards to medical liability claimants from continuing to rise at a rate
surpassing the rate of inflation.84 Figure 2, pictured below, displays
the standard payment per claim for each year from 1976 through
2012. In addition, it displays what the average would have been if
damage awards had simply kept with the rate of inflation since the
cap was enacted in 1975.85
Figure 2. Inflation-Adjusted Mean Payment per Paid Claim in
California (1976–2012)86

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Hamm, supra note 28, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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As Figure 2 exhibits, the average size of paid medical liability
claims since 1976 in California has increased at a degree that is 2.54
times the rate of inflation, despite the $250,000 MICRA cap. “As a
result, the average payment per claim in 2012 ($191,162) was more
than six times what the average would have been if it had merely
kept pace with the rate of inflation ($31,404).”87
An opponent of the Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act,
Paul R. Phinney, the President of the California Medical Association,
stated that “California trial lawyers and their allies are seeking to
change a California law to make it easier to sue doctors, hospitals,
nurses, community clinics and all other health care providers so they
can make more in legal fees, costing taxpayers.”88 The Troy and
Alana Pack Patient Safety Act’s central requirement is to change
MICRA by quadrupling the projective, non-economic damages cap
of $250,000 to $1.1 million. The four-fold increase to MICRA’s
non-economic damages cap propositioned in the ballot measure gives
trial lawyers incentive to choose to take on non-meritorious cases,
which will cause an increase in health care costs for everyone. The
new limit on the cap of non-economic damages would allow trial
lawyers to obtain three times more in legal fees than what they
currently receive under the $250,000 limit. Currently, trial lawyers
receive $74,166.67 per case, versus a potential $235,666.67 per case
under the new limit.89 Phinney further disagrees with the positions of
trial lawyers and advocates of Proposition 46, stating, “Meritless
lawsuits waste precious health care resources. The end result is
increased health care costs for everyone, plain and simple. . . . More
lawyers filing meritless lawsuits is a bad idea. MICRA works well.
We don’t need to change it just to benefit lawyers.”90
Based on the best data available, raising the cap on
non-economic damages from $250,000 to $1,000,000 or more would
cause health care costs to rise significantly in California by
approximately $9.9 billion per year. This is an average of $261 per

87. Id. at 16–17.
88. Paul R. Phinney, Don’t Let Trial Lawyers Increase Health Care Costs and Reduce

Access to Care, BUDGET WATCHDOGS (2013), http://www.budgetwatchdogs.org/increase-the
-micra-cap/.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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resident or approximately $1,000 for a family91 of four.92 This weight
of increased health care costs would be carried by three groups of
Californians—consumers, employees, and taxpayers. If the MICRA
cap is increased, consumers will be strained to pay more for their
health care, and employees who are covered by employer-subsidized
health insurance will experience a decrease in their disposable
income because their employers will seek to recover the higher costs
of providing insurance by retaining wages and salaries and by raising
deductibles and copayments.93 Taxpayers will be required to pay as
much as $2 billion94 extra per year because when health care costs
increase the state and local government will be required to pay more
to offer health care to consumers.95
Many scholars and advocates against caps on damages have
been concerned about lack of redress for non-economic damages, in
turn arguing for raising the cap. However, after the passage of the
PPACA, proponents of caps on damages have also pointed out that
with the recent wide availability of health insurance “at adjusted
community rates . . . there is less reason to be concerned that the
imposition of a cap reduc[ing] the availability of funds to cover
future economic losses such as health care costs.”96
VI. CONSIDERING MICRA, HOW DOES CALIFORNIA
COMPARE TO OTHER STATES?
Overall, MICRA has benefited the state of California by
protecting the patient and the physician, while in other states, there is
a struggle to keep healthcare affordable for patients, and physicians
struggle to afford medical liability premiums; as a result, physicians
regularly avoid providing “services in emergency rooms and trauma
and maternity centres because the fee hikes mean they can’t afford to
91. CALIFORNIANS ALLIED FOR PATIENT PROT., MICRA THE MEDICAL INJURY
COMPENSATION REFORM ACT 3 (Feb. 2005), https://www.sdcms.org/Portals/18/Assets/pdf
/micra_handbook.pdf. Currently, the medical liability costs are $280 each year for a family
of four. Id.
92. Hamm, supra note 28, at 4.
93. Id. at executive summary 7.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Nelson, supra note 7, at 451. Nelson points out that a system of caps on damages is
similar to that of Canada, “a common law jurisdiction with a fault-based medical
malpractice regime and universal access to health care.” Id. According to Nelson, in 1978,
“the Supreme Court of Canada . . . limited non-economic damages in personal injury cases
to $100,000 (CAD).” Id.
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work.”97 The AMA has placed liability reform at the top of the
national agenda, arguing that there are at least twelve states that have
a “full-blown” liability insurance crisis.98 Many, including the AMA,
have argued that, through tort reform based upon California’s
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, the crisis can be
mended.
For example, when malpractice insurance premiums increased
rapidly in Nevada, the state’s only Level 1 trauma center in Las
Vegas shut down for ten days in July 2002.99 The ten-day shutdown
alarmed legislators and they met in a special session to find a
solution. In reaction to the trauma center’s shutdown, Bill Welch, the
President and CEO of the Nevada Hospital Association in Reno,
stated that he and legislators “developed a draft bill that was modeled
100 percent on California’s liability law.”100 On August 7, 2002,
Nevada signed into law a measure similar to those of MICRA—a cap
on non-economic damages of $350,000, and a $50,000 limit on
damages for hospitals and physicians who care for trauma patients.101
Similar to the crisis in Nevada, in 2003, surgeons in West
Virginia walked off the job to protest skyrocketing malpractice
insurance fees, joining a growing succession across the county.102
This strike caused patients to be transferred to neighboring states
such as Ohio or Pennsylvania.103 However, Pennsylvania was trying
to manage a similar crisis of its own, with its hospitals beginning
to limit services because of the expected work strikes by
physicians—mainly obstetricians and surgeons.104 In Scranton,
Pennsylvania, one trauma center had closed, and another in a suburb
of Philadelphia indicated that it could be closing its doors as well
unless the liability insurance decreased.105 And in rural Arizona, the
Copper Queen Community Hospital in Bisbee ceased delivering

97. See Milan Korcok, Malpractice Fee Hikes Mean Some US MDs Can’t Afford to
Work, 4 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 472, 472 (2003).
98. Id.
99. See Richard Haugh, California, Here We Come, 10 HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS 16,
16 (2002).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Korcok, supra note 97, at 472.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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babies after family physicians saw their estimated insurance rates
increase from $15,000 to $57,000.106
These examples of physicians on strike and the shutting down of
health services can all be explained by nationwide increases in
medical liability insurance premiums. According to the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, a 2000 study analyzing
data from the years 1976 to 1999 found that medical liability
insurance premiums grew 420 percent nationally, whereas in
California they rose only 168 percent.107 The solution to the
nationwide crisis, according to the AMA, is tort reform based on
California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975,
because the act “covers medical expenses and other economic
damages following a medical misadventure, but discourages
frivolous lawsuits by limiting incentives to pursue them.”108
Considering this national crisis and the effects and benefits of
MICRA in California, how feasible would federal tort reform efforts
based on MICRA really be?
VII. THE POTENTIAL FOR MICRA TO BE USED AS
A MODEL FOR FEDERAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
Today, MICRA might be considered “conventional reform” in
that it caps non-economic damages in malpractice cases at
$250,000.109 While reform efforts that incorporate caps on damages
are presently framed as “conservative” or “Republican” in nature,
MICRA was supported primarily by Democrat Governor Jerry
Brown, and received bi-partisan support.110 During its enactment in
1975, the Act was relatively “uncontroversial.”111
Since its enactment, many have suggested that the MICRA is a
model reform for medical malpractice.112 Specifically, AMA and
efforts by former president George W. Bush have been the most
aggressive in the push for MICRA-style reform. In the early 2000s,
President Bush, alongside Republicans in Congress and the AMA,
encouraged the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Haugh, supra note 99.
Korcok, supra note 97, at 472.
Id.
Nelson, supra note 7, at 456–57.
Id.
Id. at 456.
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Healthcare Act (HEALTH Act), which was proposed legislation
modeled after MICRA.113 Specifically, the HEALTH Act proposed a
$250,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical liability cases.114
The HEALTH Act did not survive the Senate.115
Later, in 2003, the President of the AMA, Donald Palmisano,
argued for federal MICRA-style reforms, asserting that MICRA was
responsible for “keeping premium increases on medical liability
insurance in California at moderate levels.”116 He argued that
MICRA-style reform at the federal level was necessary as
“physicians could either no longer find or were unable to afford
liability insurance and thus were closing their practices, retiring or
reducing services.”117 The AMA released additional support for
MICRA-style reform in 2007.118
But despite the benefits and praise discussed in this Article, a
large amount of controversy still exists about the success and effects
of MICRA-style legislation.119 While a number of states are enacting
MICRA-like caps on damages, several high courts in states have
deemed these caps unconstitutional.120 Further, when MICRA-style
reform was suggested by Republican speakers during the 2010 health
care summit, specifically, when caps on damages were suggested,
President Barack Obama instead noted his interest in “federal
incentives for states to experiment much more vigorously with ways
to reduce frivolous lawsuits, to pursue settlements, [and] to reduce
defensive medicine.”121 When the CBO found that “federal
enactment of medical liability reform—including a cap on
non-economic damages of $250,000—would reduce federal budget
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id. at 462 (“A 2007 position paper issued by the AMA noted that ‘MICRA’s
$250,000 cap on non-economic damages has been the cornerstone of organized medicine’s
attempts to ensure a litigation system that does not hinder patient access to care.’”).
119. See Williams, supra note 1, at 479 (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers and patient advocacy
groups complain that states are unconstitutionally restricting access to the courts by enacting
legal hurdles to commencing medical malpractice claims and by capping damages, both
economic and non-economic.”). Williams highlights that currently “28 states impose a cap
on non-economic damages and six states impose a cap on total damages . . . . [S]ix state
supreme courts have ruled damages caps unconstitutional under their states’ constitutions.”
Id. at 494–96 (footnote omitted).
120. Nelson, supra note 7, at 453.
121. Id. at 445–47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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deficits by $54 billion over the period of 2009–2019,”122 President
Obama noted that “this savings was a relatively insignificant amount
in a system that spends $2 trillion annually.”123 Overall, Democrats
are largely opposed to caps on damages and view them as “unfairly
penalizing the most severely injured victims of malpractice, and
unlikely to reduce health care costs significantly.”124
Interestingly, the individual who primarily suggested MICRA
for tort reform in California, Democrat Henry Waxman, has since
argued that “while the California malpractice reforms ha[ve] been in
place in California since 1975, they had not solved the problem of
health care cost increases.”125 Further, those who are opposed to caps
on damages have asserted that reduced insurance premiums in
California are a result of the passage of Proposition 103 in 1988, not
the enactment of MICRA.126 Finally, using 2010 data from
California malpractice claims, a study by the Rand Institute for Civil
Justice127 “found a correlation between a reduction in potential
adverse patient safety incidents and fewer malpractice claims,” but
also found that “the decline in claims could not be explained by the
‘impact of tort reform within the state.’”128 Overall, the positive
effects of MICRA in the state of California seem to have been
questioned and criticized as much as they have been praised.
MICRA has been described by some legal scholars as a “double
edged sword,” unfortunately leading to a “propensity for significant
inequality.”129 Specifically, cases of catastrophic medical error may
not receive the same appropriate redress as less extreme cases of

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 445.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 445.
Nelson, supra note 7, at 447. At the time of MICRA’s introduction, the reforms
were “recommended by a committee chaired by Democrat Henry Waxman, then a member
of the California Assembly.” Id. at 456–57.
126. Id. at 468. Proposition 103 was a measure that “included a rollback on premiums,
and a mechanism for consumers to challenge rate increases.” Id.
127. Greenberg et al., supra note 71.
128. Nelson, supra note 7, at 468.
129. See Grant Wood Geckeler, The Clinton-Obama Approach to Medical Malpractice
Reform: Reviving the Most Meaningful Features of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 8 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 171, 185 (2007) (“[I]n cases of catastrophic medical error, the application
of . . . damages caps may isolate the effect of the jury award at the policymaking level.
Second, the capping of non-economic damages has shifted the perception of risks and
rewards for medical malpractice plaintiffs’ attorneys by reallocating the costs . . . from
defendants to plaintiffs and their counsel.”).
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malpractice.130 Does this propensity for inequality destroy MICRA’s
ability to effectively address the issues of malpractice insurance
premiums and patient safety, or can MICRA be modified as a model
for federal tort reform to prevent these legal pitfalls?
Some advocates for reform have suggested creating “carve-out
provisions” to address the inequalities resulting from the caps
provision of MICRA.131 One legislative change could be creating a
tort system that uses “horizontal equity,” or “treating like cases
alike.”132 This sort of change could include “standardized awards
based on age and severity of injury, a distribution of the amounts
awarded in comparable cases, and scenarios of prototypical injuries
and their corresponding awards.”133 With careful analysis and
modification, MICRA may yet have potential to serve as a model for
federal tort reform.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At the very least, scholars agree that reform for malpractice
liability has traditionally followed crises in the insurance market
“characterized by sudden spikes in rates and the withdrawal of
insurers from the market.”134 Since the national spikes in insurance
rates in 1974, California’s MICRA has been one of the sole models
for tort reform. This Article has sought to make clear that, despite
MICRA’s praise among many political and legal scholars, MICRA
continues to remain controversial, and must be carefully analyzed
before being implemented as a model for federal tort reform. As has
been previously stated, “any remedy to the medical malpractice
‘crisis’ must also incorporate the political realities of our society.”135
If MICRA is ever to be utilized as a model for federal tort
reform, there must be compromise on its tenets, such as carve-out
provisions that remedy the MICRA’s propensity for unfair treatment
of malpractice cases, which vary in severity of injuries.136
Additionally, reform of any sort must include “physician buy-in,” so
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation

as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 93 (2011).
133. Id. at 93–94.
134. Nelson, supra note 7, at 453.
135. Williams, supra note 1, at 489.
136. Geckeler, supra note 129, at 185.
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that there can be a decrease in the practice of defensive medicine;
this in turn would result in a decrease in health care costs and
unnecessary medical procedures performed, which often ignore
patient safety.137 MICRA has been deemed by many as successful
because it includes this “physician buy-in,” as physicians typically
desire “stable, affordable malpractice insurance premiums,” and “tort
reform that caps non-economic damages to prevent what [physicians]
consider . . . jury awards that exceed their malpractice insurance
policy limits.”138 If legislators and legal scholars can work toward
further evaluating and modifying reform models like MICRA to
more effectively address malpractice cases, medical liability laws
may help physicians return to making “cost-effective investments in
patient safety,”139 which in turn benefit not only providers, but
provides patients with adequate redress from medical error.

137. See Williams, supra note 1, at 490–91; see also Nelson, supra note 7, at 482
(explaining how defensive medicine, in reaction to increased medical liability insurance
premiums, resulted in physicians performing more cesarean sections, and that “this effect
was greater for women of lower socioeconomic groups.”).
138. Williams, supra note 1, at 490.
139. See Jennifer Arlen, Contracting Over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost
of Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 959 (2010).
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